In the previous post in this series, I suggested that we don’t need a concept of truth for representations that we ourselves form. Somebody living alone as a hermit would not need to be concerned about truth. Any method of forming a useful representation will be based on some correspondence between reality and the representation so formed. And as long as we interpret a representation using the same correspondence, we will be fine. That consistency between forming the representation and interpreting that representation breaks down as soon as we start to use a public language.
Within a language community, one person forms a representation of reality in linguistic form perhaps by describing some event. Then other persons have to interpret that representation.
There is no possibility of perfect consistency between describer and interpreter. The description is made using one person’s perceptual system, and then listeners have to interpret that description based on how they connect that description to their own perception of reality.
In order for language to work at all, there needs to be at least an approximate consistency between describer and listener. When there is a insufficient consistency between describer and listener, this shows up as a disagreement. And we use our concept of truth to express our disagreement. In a language community we need truth for two main purposes. We need it to express disagreement, when there is a failure of consistency between describer and listener. And we need it, typically by arguing over truth, to help us align our correspondences with one another.
We can think of a language community as somehow adopting a system of conventions that express the correspondence to be used between reality and language descriptions of reality. This system of conventions becomes, in effect, the system of meaning conventions of the community. The conventions used are mostly informal, so cannot be written down. Reaching complete agreement on the meaning conventions is likely to be impossible, because of the difficulties that Quine explains in his argument on the inscrutability of reference. Our arguments over the truth of description are part of how we do come to at least an approximate agreement.