In an earlier post (almost three years ago), I asserted that I am not a materialist. I have had people argue with me about that, and suggest that I was being disingenuous.
In the debates between Rupert Sheldrake and Michael Shermer, Shedrake’s opening statement includes a bunch of questions related to materialism, that he poses to Shermer. So I thought I would give my answers to those questions. And then you can decide for yourself whether I should be considered a materialist.
Mechanism
Sheldrake’s first question: Is nature mechanical?
I have never thought so. I take biological organisms to be an important part of what we mean by “nature”, and biology has always seemed very different from mechanics. Rocks, earthquakes, etc — yes, I consider those to be mechanical. But not living things.
People disagree over what they mean by “mechanism”. Living things don’t fit with what I consider to be mechanism.
Sheldrake ends that section with:
Michael, do you think of yourself as a complex machine or as a conscious living organism?
I answer — I consider myself a conscious living organism.
I’ll add this. I do think of my physical body as a complex machine. But I do not identify myself with my physical body. To identify myself with my body would be an example of what Gilbert Ryle called a “category mistake.”
Consciousness
Sheldrake asks: Is matter unconscious?
I think so, though I would not know how to tell. There are some people who adopt the thesis of panpsychism — everything is a little bit conscious. While I cannot rule that out, it does seem unlikely.
I’m not sure of Sheldrake. From the fact that he poses this question, I can only wonder whether he is a proponent of panpsychism.
The Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century gave birth to modern science by creating a radical dualism between unconscious matter and conscious, non-material minds possessed only by humans, angels, and God.
I don’t go along with traditional dualism (or Cartesian dualism). I see no need to invent an immaterial substance.
By denying the existence of immaterial consciousness, atheistic materialists got rid of God and angels at one stroke. There were no longer two realms of reality, matter and consciousness; there was only one reality, matter.
That view seems too restrictive. As I see it, there is matter and there is behavior. Science studies motion, but motion is not made of matter. For sure, it is matter that moves when there is motion. But we study motion independently of the particular matter that is moving. I have previously identified myself as a behaviorist, though perhaps not a traditional behaviorist.
When I say that I do not identify myself with my physical body, I am instead thinking of myself as something like a system of behaviors, with the physical body being an implementation detail.
I am puzzled by people who say that consciousness is an illusion. As best I can tell, something like consciousness is required in order for illusions to be possible.
Sheldrake ends this section with:
Do you believe that you have free will?
Yes, I do, though there is considerable disagreement about what we mean by “free will.”
Conservation laws
In his third question, Sheldrake asks: Is the total amount of matter and energy always the same?
I’ve never been sure of that. The conservation laws work well in physics. The apparent long term stability of the solar system seems to argue for them.
Conservation is, in part, a conceptual construct. Our every day experience is that energy runs down. We account for this by saying that entropy increases. Roughly speaking, we hold that the amount of energy remains the same, but it loses its effectiveness. This is how we have chosen to conceptualize our world. But our construction of concepts does not seem to completely account for conservation, which is why I remain unsure.
Sheldrake connects this to Big Bang cosmology:
Do you believe that the total amount of dark matter and dark energy is always the same (except at the moment of the Big Bang)?
In truth, I have never fully accepted Big Bang cosmology. The evidence seems to be pretty clear in the existence of a cosmological red shift. But I am not yet convinced that a Big Bang origin is the best explanation of this. Some of the possible alternatives do appear to allow subtle exceptions to the conservation laws.
Laws of nature
In his next question, Sheldrake asks: Are the laws of nature fixed?
I take the skeptical view, that there are no laws of nature. Or, more precisely, if there are laws of nature then those are unknowable to us.
There are, of course, laws of physics and other scientific laws. But I see these as human constructs. I see them as part of how we choose to conceptualize the universe. As far as I can tell, there is nothing that compels us to conceptualize it in the way that we do. We have changed how we conceptualize our world from the mechanics of Aristotle, to that of Galileo and Newton, then to relativistic mechanics, and later to quantum mechanics. I see this as scientific pragmatism. When we find a better way of conceptualizing our world, we jump to that in what Kuhn called a “paradigm shift.”
Purpose
Is nature purposeless?
I’m unsure how to answer this, because it is not clear what is being asked.
Biological organisms seem to behave in a purposeful way, where the purpose is continued existence. But the question appears to be about nature as a whole, rather than about individual organisms.
According to the Gaia hypothesis of Lovelock and Margulis, there appears to be some sort of homeostasis of the biosphere as a whole. That would make it purposeful, with a purpose of maintaining stasis. However, when we look beyond that to the stars and galaxies, it is hard to see anything that looks like purpose. It all has the appearance of happenstance. So even if Gaia can be said to be purposeful, and individual organisms can be said to have purposes, they all appear to result from happenstance.
Biological inheritance
Is all biological inheritance material?
Given my behaviorist view, I tend to take an organism as a system of behavior rather than a physical body. And the initial processes that begin the existence of a new organism come directly from the parents, rather than being a product of DNA. So no, I don’t see that as all material. The DNA is material, but life itself appears to be continuous.
The question is about inheritance. Some of the characteristics of a new organism are derived from the environment in which it developed. This includes the environment of the uterus or the egg or seed. And those are provided by the parent, so characteristics that derive from parental environment would allow some sort of inheritance that is not directly from the DNA.
However, it does appear that inheritance is predominantly via the DNA.
Memories
Are memories stored as material traces?
Human memories appear to be reconstructions, rather than retrievals from a store. So I am skeptical of store–retrieve models of memory and I am skeptical of the “brain as computer” views of human cognition.
Minds
Are minds confined to brains?
I tend to think of the mind as mostly metaphor. We use that term to express that which does the thinking.
As far as I can see, brains do not think. People think, and use their brains to make thinking possible. But I don’t see thought as confined to brains. Our thinking is very much about our relation to our world. I’m doubtful that a brain in a vat would have any thoughts at all.
Telepathy
Are unexplained phenomena like telepathy illusory?
They appear to be illusory. They do not appear to withstand rigorous testing. If phenomena such as telepathy do exist, then they appear to be very weak and of little or no importance.
Medicine
Is mechanistic medicine the only kind that really works?
I’m not quite sure what “mechanistic medicine” is supposed to mean. Some medication acts to stimulate behavior. But there are other ways of affecting behavior, such as changing one’s outlook on life, changing ones exercise habits or changing one’s diet. And there does seem to be a placebo effect.
I don’t think those all fit well under the title “mechanistic medicine.”
Am I a materialist?
Feel free to offer your opinion in comments.
My own assessment is that my outlook is different from that of Michael Shermer, but it is also different from that of Rupert Sheldrake. I don’t see the term “materialist” is being particularly useful as a way of describing my outlook.