May 31, 2016
This is my reaction to a post that I saw today at The Brains Blog:
(that post title is really in all caps, so I had to retype to make it look reasonable).
At first glance, that title looks good. The statement that the mind is not a hoard of sentences fits with my repeated criticism of the idea that knowledge is justified true belief. However, as I read further into that blog post, I realize that I still have a lot of disagreement with the author.
The blog post is written by Christopher Mole and, in part, it is saying something about Mole’s book “The Unexplained Intellect”. I have not read the book itself. It comes in at $54.95 for the Kindle edition, which is a bit pricey for me.
Here’s the second paragraph of that blog post:
We do not currently have a satisfactory account of how minds could be had by material creatures. If such an account is to be given then every mental phenomenon will need to find a place within it. Many will be accounted for by relating them to other things that are mental, but there must come a point at which we break out of the mental domain, and account for some things that are mental by reference to some that are not. It is unclear where this break out point will be. In that sense it is unclear which mental entities are, metaphysically speaking, the most fundamental.
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May 18, 2016
There’s a weird post at the ENV site:
For those who don’t know, ENV is a blog from the Discovery Institute, the organization that does three things: (1) it pushes “Intelligent Design”, (2) It attempts to have ID taught as science in the schools, and (3) it denies that it tries to have ID taught as science in the schools.
So when the Discovery Institute says that we should tolerate differences in scientific viewpoints, I’m inclined to take that as an argument that alternative science should be taught in the schools. Here, “alternative science” could mean ID, or it could mean global warming denial (and the Discovery Institute does appear to be a hotbed of global warming denial). It could possibly also mean vaccination denialism, though I don’t think that they themselves have supported the anti-vax proponents.
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May 16, 2016
As suggested in the previous post, I think of a cognitive system as an information system. In this post, I want to look at a particular information system, namely a video camera.
Let me be very clear here. I do not think that a cognitive system is very much like a video camera. Rather, I see them as very different. However, by looking at a video camera, we can examine some basic principles that seem to be common to all information systems, including human cognitive systems.
In particular, we want to look at:
- the input phase, where data is gathered;
- the organization phase, where the data is assembled together;
- the output stream — the final output information.
The input phase
For the video camera, the data is gathered into a pixel map. I am going to describe this as categorization. That might seem a strange term to use for generating a pixel map, so I should first explain why I am using that term.
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May 15, 2016
As cognitive agents, we inform ourselves about the world and we use that information to control our behavior. We also report information to others, as I am doing in this blog post. This post is part of a series on my own philosophy. It will mainly be about the meaning of the word “information” as I use it when discussing cognition.
I shall be using “information” to refer to what is often called Shannon Information, after the work of Claude Shannon. The term “Shannon Information” has come to mean information in the form of a structured sequence of symbols, such as a natural language sentence or a data transmission stream on the Internet. Shannon’s own research was not limited to the use of transmission in discrete units (such as words or bits), but its main use is with discrete units.
Shannon information is often criticized as being an entirely syntactic view of information. Shannon was concerned with communication, with getting the stream of discrete symbols from the source to the destination. His theory is not concerned with issues of meaning or semantics.
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May 14, 2016
Recently, my posts have been infrequent. That’s partly, because of frustration.
Scientists often criticize philosophy. And, when they do, philosophers retort that scientists do a lot of philosophy themselves. That’s true. But it misses the point that the kind of philosophy that scientists do is often very different from what analytic philosophers do.
I’ve decided to try a new track. Instead of pointing to disagreements with analytic philosophers, I shall attempt to outline my own ideas of how philosophy should be done. In particular, it will be a guide to how I look at the questions related to human cognition. And then, I will contrast that with what analytic philosophers appear to be doing. I’ve created a new category “My Philosophy” to use for these posts.
To me, the kind of philosophy that I see coming from academic philosophers resembles religion. I sometimes think of it as the religion of the academy. What makes it look like religion is a strong emphasis on preserving ancient traditions.
Philosophers tend to be bright people. The posts on my philosophy will be suggesting where I might hope that they will redirect their analytical skills.