I don’t much like the word “qualia”. I don’t find it useful. People who use that word (and its singular form “quale”) hope to be able to discuss questions about conscious experience. In this post, I’ll try to address those topics without the assumptions that seem to be built into use of “qualia.”
I’ll start with a review of earlier posts in this series.
- Experience: I have identified this with internal activity of homeostatic processes, such as are commonly found in biological systems. In particular, I have identified “experience” (with the scare quotes) with internal event to which the system reacts, so can be said to be reactively aware. How we become conscious, and not merely reactively aware, I take to be related to our ability to have thoughts. I expect to discuss thought in a future post.
- Information: I have suggested that an organism acquires information about the world, and represents this information as internal events of which the organism is reactively aware. This reactive awareness of represented information mediates the organisms awareness or consciousness of the external world. Perhaps one could think of information as being represented by biochemical events or by neural events. I prefer to not be that specific, because I am discussing principles rather than implementation details. AI proponents will want to consider whether computational events could be used instead of neural events.
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