This post is mainly to point you to an interesting interview with Alex Rosenberg.
which was brought to my attention by Brian Leiter’s blog post.
Rosenberg is a materialist/ naturalist/ physicalist — perhaps we could say that he is a die-hard materialist. And in this interview, he explains his reductive naturalism. I am on record as not being a materialist (or physicalist or naturalist). So you can look to Rosenberg to express some of the views from which I dissent.
I am undecided on whether to have a full post about Rosenberg’s views. In the meantime, here are a couple of quotes:
How to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism remains a vexed question in biology, in psychology, and of course among metaphysicians as well.
That pretty much summarizes why I am not a materialist or a physicalist. Namely, I am not a reductionist, and materialism without reductionism does not seem to have any implications worth valuing.
Intentionality—the aboutness of propositional thoughts: a half century of the philosophy of psychology and we still haven’t figured out how it is even possible.
And this is where reductionism fails.