I have previously discussed some of the problems that I have with the so-called correspondence theory of truth. In this post, I shall suggest my own theory.

I am describing it as modest, because it does not attempt to settle all truth questions. The use of “true” in ordinary language is a mess, and my theory will not attempt to address all such use. Rather, it is intended only for technical uses, such as in mathematics and science.

In my last post, I made a distinction between ordinary mathematical statements such as and the axiom systems (such as the Peano axioms) that we use to prove those ordinary statements. There is widespread agreement on truth questions about those ordinary mathematical questions. But there is less agreement about whether axioms are true. Mathematics can be done, without settling questions on the truth of the axioms used.

Coming up with axiom systems is also part of mathematics. But when a new axiom system is offered, the main concern is on whether that axiom system is useful. Whether the axioms are true is often not asked, perhaps because there isn’t a good way to decide. Axiom systems are usually adopted on a pragmatic basis. That is, they are adopted for their usefulness.

Something similar happens in science. The ideal gas laws of physics are a good example. Those laws are true only for an imagined ideal gas. They are false for any real gas. But although technically false, they provide a pretty good approximation of the behavior of real gases. And that makes them very useful. So, with the gas laws, we see important scientific laws that are adopted on a pragmatic basis, even though they might be technically false.

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